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The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN Context



Sorpong Peou

The end of the Cold War has raised some interesting conceptual issues relating to the question of global governance in a turbulent world. This has been characterized as a movement away from state-centrism toward multicentrism by some scholars who view the world as being in a state of complexity, commotion, and uncertainty.¹ Some have been looking at the possibilities of enabling the UN system to cope with new demands and rising challenges. Andy Knight, for example, has developed a *subsidiarity model* for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy by way of making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter operational. He argues that post-Cold War needs and demands placed on the UN are unprecedented and thus require a new global governance structure based on the concept of *panarchy*—that is, rule of all by all for all. Plagued by the problem of overstretch, the UN system needs to be restructured in such a way that will promote a global division of labor between the UN and other regional, transnational, state, substate, and nonstate actors.²

Subsidiarity is “the principle according to which a central authority should have subsidiary functions, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at more immediate or local level.” This can be worked out in two different ways: bottom-up subsidiarity, in which central authorities (e.g., the UN) play a subsidiary or auxiliary role, and top-down subsidiarity, in which central authorities exercise political power in a noncentralized way. The subsidiarity model rests on two basic nonrealist assumptions: bottom-up subsidiarity can work when member states of regional organizations are technically and financially competent and politically capable of achieving collective action; top-down subsidiarity can succeed when members of regional organizations care less about their sovereignty, and the great powers in the UN system are willing to let regional organizations take part in the decisionmaking process and policy execution.³

I explore the subject matter further by drawing some lessons from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). I explore it in this way for several reasons. First, the prospect of a UN-ASEAN division of labor has

not been adequately looked at (more attention has been given to Central America).⁴ In addition, the grouping has been viewed as Southeast Asia's most successful regional organization and as one of the Third World's few successful regional bodies.⁵ Finally, despite economic successes, the region is still facing a host of unconventional and conventional security problems (i.e., transnational issues like uncontrolled migration, narcotics smuggling and piracy, social-economic inequalities, unresolved territorial disputes, arms buildups, and civil strife). These security problems—whether external or internal, political-military or social-environmental—can be managed or resolved only if there is real progress toward democracy (free and fair elections and respect for human rights) and toward sustainable economic development.⁶ At least three immediate measures (which require public goods and collective action at various levels) must be taken: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and postconflict peace building. Does the subsidiarity model have any applicability in the UN-ASEAN context? The concept of *comparative advantage* to be enjoyed by both the UN and ASEAN in dealing with issues related to peace and security has been recently proposed.⁷ The literature that looks at regional organizations as conflict managers, however, remains largely skeptical about their potential as a replacement for the UN because of their significant shortcomings and feeble institutional capacities.⁸ If the subsidiarity model were to succeed, the UN must also become less centralized or “a system of international co-operation that is more democratic, complex and flexible than the current one.”⁹

Within the limited scope of this article, I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of ASEAN and UN capabilities in determining the prospect of their future division of labor. I argue only that, although we may be able to take the subsidiarity model seriously some time in the next century, at least three factors make it difficult to apply the model now: ASEAN is still not competent to provide public goods on a sufficiently large scale (e.g., resources to help rebuild war-torn countries like Cambodia) and still remains politically incapable of taking collective enforcement action; ASEAN still defends state sovereignty; and the UN system remains highly centralized.

Security Challenges and ASEAN's Capabilities

One of the challenges to the bottom-up approach to subsidiarity is that, although the existing security problems in the region have been complex and, in many cases, beyond ASEAN's competence, a UN-ASEAN division of labor remains unrealized.

Security Challenges in the Southeast Asian Region

Southeast Asia has been one of the world's most troubled regions. During the Cold War period, Indochina alone (i.e., Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam)

had experienced three bloody wars. Known as the First Indochina War (1945–1954), the Second Indochina War (1965–1975), and the Third Indochina War (1978–1989), these wars produced enormous destruction and resulted in the loss of millions of lives.

In today's Southeast Asia, numerous security problems—both conventional and nonconventional—still exist. Among the political-military sources of insecurity are unresolved border and territorial disputes within and on the margins of the region, continuing arms buildups, and domestic or civil conflict. Desmond Ball, for example, has identified a sustained buildup of modern conventional weapons systems, which continues despite the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Regional defense spending has increased. Southeast Asia's defense forces have been restructured, moving away from counterinsurgency capabilities to an emphasis on modern high-technology and maritime strategy. Ball attributes the acquisition programs to a number of factors: economic growth and the need for enhanced self-reliance; the drawdown of the U.S. military presence and capabilities in the region; small states' fears of "the dragons"; the increasing salience of regional conflict (involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy, and territorial disputes); and economic and environmental defense. Ball also includes prestige, technology acquisition and reverse engineering, corruption, supply-side pressures, action-reaction, and arms race dynamics. Of all these factors, however, military and geostrategic factors are generally less determinate than other factors. "There is no arms race under way in the region," Ball writes, but "there are some disturbing features of the current acquisition programs."¹⁰

Other security analysts have expressed concern about the prospect of instability and insecurity in East Asia. They agree that there is no arms race at the moment. Some, like Aaron Friedberg, argue that the region is entering a transitional period of rapid change, however, which may give rise to an arms race and recurrent crises. Asia is "ripe for rivalry" because the region lacks democratic states whose economies are still less interdependent and because no nuclear deterrence exists. Richard Betts similarly contends that the region is becoming more unstable, due in part to the uncertain and potentially dangerous fluid distribution of international power and in part to the lack of political democratization along with the presence of economic liberalization.¹¹

Whether or not an arms race is now under way or will be in the coming years, today's Southeast Asia is far from being permanently stable. This raises the issue of whether ASEAN has the capability and the political will to deal with some of the security problems mentioned earlier without having to burden the UN. In the paragraphs that follow, I assess ASEAN's competencies in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace building and explain why it may or may not be able to replace the UN as a conflict manager or whether their division of labor is possible.

ASEAN's Limited Competencies

If bottom-up subsidiarity is to have any meaning at all, ASEAN must display its ability to deal with security problems within the region. Looking at its security role reveals its limitations in resolving territorial disputes and in peacekeeping and peace building.

Interstate disputes. It may be fair and useful to begin assessing ASEAN's conflict management capabilities by simply recognizing the grouping's past and present positive record: it has so far succeeded in preventing its members from going to war with one another. This is widely known as the "ASEAN way" of war avoidance. Simon Sheldon wrote: "A dramatic indication of the remarkable degree of harmony within ASEAN at the turn of the decade [1970s] is that the Sabah/Moro Rebellion dispute is the only significant potentially disruptive conflict within ASEAN." He goes on to assert that, "[compared] with the mid-1960s when every member had at least one outstanding dispute with another, many of which had led to armed confrontation, the increase in amity and reduction in tension is more prominent than any other world region."¹² According to Robert Scalapino, "ASEAN has reduced bilateral tensions within the six-nation group. State-to-state war risk in this region is lower than ever before."¹³ Tim Huxley similarly recognizes that ASEAN "is by far the most successful Third World regional organization." He further adds that "its [ASEAN's] diplomatic cohesion and apparent intra-mural harmony, together with the increasing economic prosperity of most of its members relative to the rest of the world, have led to it becoming something of a model for other regions aspiring to similar success."¹⁴

Nevertheless, many security problems like border and territorial disputes partly associated with arms acquisition, as pointed out earlier, remain unresolved or are simply left on the back burner. The ASEAN states have not made any serious attempts to engage in arms control or develop formal dispute settlement mechanisms. In 1976, they signed their first-ever treaty. Known as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, its objective "is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and co-operation among their peoples." In Chapter IV of the treaty, they agreed to "settle disputes through regional processes" and established "a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognisance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony."¹⁵ The high council, however, has to this day never been invoked. The member states have either placed their territorial disputes on the back burner, resorted to quiet diplomacy, or—if they disagreed on how to resolve them—made appeal for UN action or intervention. Recently, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Singapore and Malaysia have agreed to bring their territorial disputes to the

International Court of Justice. At the Post-Ministerial Conference in July 1996, for example, Singapore foreign minister S. Jayakumar urged other countries in the South China Sea region to “scrupulously” obey the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Peacemaking and peacekeeping role. ASEAN has been unable to act collectively on extra-ASEAN security matters. A good example of ASEAN dependence on the UN is the Cambodian crisis. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, the ASEAN states could not reverse the military developments in Indochina. All they could do was to mobilize international support in the UN to put pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.¹⁶ ASEAN’s diplomatic successes, however, were limited to keeping the international community interested in Cambodia. Muthiah Alagappa concludes that ASEAN could make a “limited but valuable” contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in terms of conflict prevention, containment, and termination. He notes that ASEAN had only a limited role in *conflict prevention* among nonmember regional states because it lacked a credible deterrence strategy. In terms of *conflict containment*, ASEAN was more effective. But this relative success depended very much on “a number of factors including the regionalist credentials of the organization, its cohesion and solidarity, collective diplomatic skills and more significantly, on favorable international circumstances.” In the Cambodian context, “nearly all factors worked to the advantage of ASEAN.”¹⁷ By early 1990, the real peace process had begun, finally progressing to the Paris accord, in which the warring Cambodian factions officially invited the UN to intervene in their country. The UN then set up a mission—the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)—to create a neutral environment for free and fair elections. But it is noteworthy that the multifaceted mission was made possible because of the collective action of and coercive diplomacy by the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council, not because ASEAN acted alone or independently.¹⁸

This is not to say that the ASEAN states have not been active in UN peacekeeping activities at all. Indonesia, for example, has participated in the UN missions deployed in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia. Malaysia has also participated in at least sixteen peacekeeping missions. It sent 3,400 troops to the UN peacekeeping operation in Congo, an observer team to the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, personnel to Namibia (UNTAG), a military battalion to Cambodia (UNTAC), a mechanized infantry battalion group to assist UNOSOM in Somalia in 1993, and a battalion made up of “mechanized” troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1993. However, ASEAN still does not have a common policy on UN peacekeeping. Even during the UN intervention in Cambodia, the members separately contributed their own troops and personnel to UNTAC. Proposals for

the establishment of ASEAN peacekeeping forces and an ASEAN peacekeeping center have repeatedly fallen on deaf ears. Indonesia, for example, rejected a proposal by Malaysia and Singapore to establish a joint peacekeeping force to be placed under the UN banner; it still preferred to see each ASEAN member send its forces to support the various UN missions. On 15 February 1995, the defense and security minister, Edi Sudradjat, told parliamentarians that it would work better "if each ASEAN contingent works separately and carries out its duties according to its own operational doctrine."¹⁹

Postconflict peace-building role. ASEAN's role in postconflict peace building is even more disappointing. Despite their well-known economic successes, the ASEAN states have not been among Cambodia's major donors. In fact, the more than \$2 billion pledged by donors during the period 1992–1995 came from states outside Southeast Asia and from multilateral institutions. The pledges come from Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, and other European states (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands), and from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank, UN agencies (e.g., the UN Development Programme), and the European Union (EU). ASEAN states have been among Cambodia's minor donors. Thailand's aid disbursement for Cambodia from 1992 to 1996 was little more than \$9 million. Technical aid (i.e., English-language training and other areas of human resource development) provided to Cambodia by ASEAN states has been limited. Between 1992 and 1995, Indonesia disbursed \$628,000 in aid, and wealthy Singapore disbursed only \$160,000.²⁰ This does not suggest that ASEAN states could not play any role at all in peace building. Private companies in Malaysia and Singapore, backed by their governments, are among Cambodia's major foreign investors. It remains unclear, however, as to what extent the profit-driven private sector can contribute to the peace process.

ASEAN's limited conflict resolution role can be further illustrated by its member states' inability so far to restore the status quo ante in post-UN Cambodia after the coup d'état in July 1997. The coalition arrangement between Second Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party and First Prime Minister Norodom Ranaridh of the royalist party (known as Funcinpec) made after the UN-organized elections in May 1993 ran into trouble when the former successfully used force to oust the latter. ASEAN, whose members were signatories of the Cambodian Paris agreement, considered Cambodia a "special case" for its intervention. It first postponed Cambodia's entry into the fold and then sent two subsequent peace missions to Phnom Penh. Its mediation efforts, however, failed to effect any change, and Hun Sen continued to eliminate pro-Ranaridh elements. ASEAN's weaknesses lay in at least two aspects: (1) its members were divided over the

coup—Laos, Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia favored Cambodia's early entry, but others demanded that its admission be postponed indefinitely; (2) when warned not to meddle in Cambodia's domestic affairs, ASEAN ended its mediation efforts but pressed Hun Sen to organize free and fair elections (which were held in July 1998). ASEAN may therefore need to help mobilize international support in the UN, as it did on Cambodia during the early 1980s. In the final analysis, however, for ASEAN to show more effectiveness, it must succeed in helping to resolve the Cambodian crisis.

New Prescription for UN-ASEAN Division of Labor

Since ASEAN's establishment in 1967, its cooperation with the UN has evolved, if slowly. ASEAN's UN policy has been made clear by many official documents. At the ASEAN summit in Singapore in 1992, more specifically, the member states agreed to work with the UN by acknowledging the latter as "a key instrument for maintaining international peace and security." The Singapore Declaration of that year further indicates that "ASEAN will encourage all efforts to strengthen the United Nations, including its role and capabilities in peacekeeping and peacemaking, in accordance with the United Nations Charter."²¹ ASEAN's interest in cooperating with the UN in the security field was again stressed at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok in 1995. The member states not only continued to show support for the UN Charter (as they had since the 1960s) but also collectively indicated that their organization "shall explore ways and means to enhance co-operation with the United Nations, with a view to promoting peace and stability in the region."²²

ASEAN lacks formal ties with the UN, however, which can be explained by looking at the former's organizational structure. ASEAN has formal ties with the European Union, having established a special coordinating committee (SCANN) in the early 1970s. The ASEAN countries send their ambassadors to the European community (EC) in Brussels, where they serve on the ASEAN-Brussels Committee that facilitates the work of SCANN. Yet ASEAN is not like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which "has sought to deepen its institutional and operational ties with the UN."²³ Thus, Indonesian scholar Jusuf Wanandi, for example, suggests that ASEAN improve its relations with the UN in coordinating peacekeeping activities and in preventive diplomacy. He foresees the need for ASEAN to invite the UN secretary-general to its annual Post-Ministerial Conference or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by according him observer status.²⁴ ASEAN should also work toward establishing a more permanent arrangement with the UN and direct access to the secretary-general and the council.²⁵

Others call for further UN-ASEAN cooperation for peace and preventive diplomacy, with a recognition that ASEAN is not equipped to handle all

security problems on its own. Roger Uren, for example, points out that the UN can do much to help promote regional security in Southeast Asia because the global institution enjoys universally respected status capable of shaping global norms, and because it has the world's most powerful states as permanent members, "which give real weight to UN activities." The UN has also begun to lay the foundations for dealing with arms buildups, by establishing a register of conventional arms transfers that is designed to promote greater transparency about the arms acquisition programs. The UN also can bridge the gap between the ASEAN states and in the regional process of confidence and security building.²⁶ So far, however, unlike in its relations with the EU, ASEAN has not accompanied by real action its rhetoric about enhancing its institutional cooperation with the UN in the security field.

ASEAN: Problems of Collective Action

Why has there not been a UN-ASEAN division of labor in the security field? In this section of the article, I discuss bottom-up subsidiarity first. Although ASEAN has expressed interest in working with the UN, its members have not been terribly successful in resolving security problems collectively, because they are small powers and primarily interested in upholding the principle of state sovereignty. As I point out, ASEAN is not a supranational community but simply a group of states interested in regional cooperation because of their concern with regime insecurity.

ASEAN's Raison d'être

The Southeast Asian grouping remains a nonmilitary organization. It was never intended to be a military alliance/defense community or a supranational organization as is understood in the literature of international relations. Until the end of the Cold War, external security matters in ASEAN had not been given much public attention. Regional political cooperation did not get officially mentioned in formal documents until after the fall of Indochina in 1975. At their First Summit in 1976, the ASEAN states began to show their political solidarity by signing two documents: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.²⁷ Although it was the sole official ASEAN document to give consideration to security cooperation, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord refers only to "continuation of a cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with the mutual needs and interests."²⁸

ASEAN has taken the lead in building a new security architecture with outside powers through consultative processes, such as the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum. After the Fourth

Summit in January 1992, ASEAN moved to consider regional security. In June, a senior officials meeting (SOM) on regional security was launched. After the Post-Ministerial Meeting in July 1993, the ARF was announced. On 24 July 1994, the regional forum inaugurated its annual ministerial meetings. Such steps, broadly known as confidence- and security-building measures, encourage greater transparency about major arms acquisition programs and strategic objectives. But these measures have often been criticized as inadequate. The regional forum is far from being a collective defense pact; it is only “a consultative process to further the benefits of constructive engagement: economic development and stability.”²⁹ Michael Leifer characterizes the cooperative security-based ASEAN regional forum as “the biblical Hebrews in Egypt being obliged to make bricks without straw.”³⁰

In spite of the concern with external threat shared by some ASEAN states (e.g., communist threat from China in the 1970s and from Indochina throughout the 1980s), ASEAN’s *raison d’être* was primarily security regime building through peaceful and progressive economic development to promote social stability within the national boundaries and through security from external interference in the members’ domestic affairs. Amitav Acharya asserts that the traditional way of explaining regional cooperation on the basis of extraregional threat is inadequate. It is the national regimes in power, which shared the same interest in self-preservation and the same perception of common internal enemies, that motivated the formation of ASEAN.³¹ The conceptual foundation on which ASEAN was built is what Leifer calls “internal collective security.”³²

Defending State Sovereignty

ASEAN’s steadfast adherence to the political principles of internal and external sovereignty in the Westphalian sense of the term is reflected in the constant concern of member states with the problem of what some scholars consider “inadequate statehood” and with a lack of unconditional political legitimacy.³³ Member states’ ability to control the territory, people, and resources within their respective national boundaries remains relatively weak in that they have not achieved “unconditional political legitimacy”; concern about defending territorial integrity and the search for equality of international status in a world of unequal powers have also preoccupied the ASEAN leaders. This explains why ASEAN has not developed into a supranational organization. It remains highly decentralized, and its secretariat—based in Jakarta—does not enjoy any executive power.³⁴ In spite of the ministerial status granted to him by the ASEAN member states in 1992, the secretary-general is often described as a “postman” unable to effect change without the consent of member states. The decentralized nature of ASEAN still confirms its members’ state-centric behavior, even in the post-Cold War era.³⁵

The ASEAN states' pursuit of political independence and their defense of state sovereignty can be further explained by the way they make decisions. With emphasis on the need to promote regional cooperation, ASEAN decisionmaking has been based on the principle of consensus and accommodation. There are no formal rules by which all ASEAN members must abide or by which they can be punished for noncompliance.³⁶ In ASEAN's "culture of consultation," member states do not confront each other publicly but discuss issues of mutual concern at their private and informal meetings.

ASEAN's defense of state sovereignty can be further explained by simply looking at the way in which the member states offer financial support to their secretariat. Each member state, poor or rich, is required to make an annual financial contribution of \$1 million to the ASEAN Fund. With nine members, the contribution yields a total annual budget of \$9 million for the secretariat. Although this may sound significant to some observers, it reveals the members' mediocre commitment to their secretariat. The \$9 million budget is for the work of an international organization in a region that has close to five hundred million people. The members' total contribution represents only an extremely tiny fraction of each member's own national budget. The defense budget alone of each ASEAN state was much higher than the ASEAN secretariat's total budget: the Philippines—\$1,004 million in 1995; Malaysia—\$2.41 billion in 1995; Indonesia—\$2.57 billion in 1996; Thailand—\$4 billion in 1995; Singapore—\$4.02 billion in 1995.³⁷

State Sovereignty of ASEAN Versus Popular Sovereignty of the UN

ASEAN's defense of state sovereignty (reflected in the primacy of domestic security) sheds light not only on the weakness of its collective decision-making but also on the contradiction between the Southeast Asian countries' adherence to the concept of state sovereignty and the UN's Lockean liberal doctrine of popular sovereignty.

During his term of office, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pushed for domestic democratic governance and respect for human rights in the direction where absolute state sovereignty is no longer acceptable. He wrote: "Time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."³⁸ But the ASEAN states are not about to agree with the secretary-general. Many of the ASEAN member states are not liberal democracies. Although Thailand and the Philippines are liberal democracies, they are far from being mature.³⁹ Malaysia has sustained only semidemocratic status. The other states in Southeast Asia are somewhere between partial

and full-blown authoritarianism.⁴⁰ Laos and Myanmar, which joined ASEAN in July 1997, remain authoritarian (the former ruled by the Communist Party and the latter under junta rule). In the nine-member ASEAN, authoritarian regimes far outnumber fragile democratic ones. When Cambodia enters the fold, it will add to the list of authoritarian regimes. ASEAN has also been ambivalent about, or even resistant to, UN attempts to universalize human rights. ASEAN states view human rights as based on the Western philosophy of political rights and tend to define rights in communitarian and social-economic terms. The contrast between the political ideologies developed by UN bureaucrats and those advocated by ASEAN states remains strong.⁴¹ ASEAN states have interpreted the emphasis on democratic governance as intrusive.⁴²

This point should not, however, be taken to imply that all Asians are antidemocratic and oppose the human rights movement. There is indeed a distinction between state ideology (which defends state sovereignty) and populist ideology (which defends popular sovereignty). Nevertheless, the literature on political and social change in Southeast Asia shows that the ASEAN states are not rapidly becoming more democratic—either because the state continues to expand its political space or because social groups have conformed to state ideology or simply are incapable of acting as agents of change. In Singapore, the state continues to play the most dominant role in restricting the activity of social forces.⁴³ The same can be said of Malaysia. As James Jesudason put it, the country's "political system has not become more democratic over the last twenty-five years" because neither formal political opposition parties nor civil society groups are capable of offering "an immediate programmatic alternative to the [incumbent] regime."⁴⁴ Political democracy (driven by economic growth) in Thailand is still far from being mature, as the recent currency crisis has shown.⁴⁵ This point is also recognized by Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra. Although "the private sector has become more powerful, capable of exerting pressure on the government directly or indirectly," they remark persuasively, "it has proved incapable of controlling the nucleus of state power. . . . Rather, it has been 'co-opted' by the bureaucratic-activist state."⁴⁶

The UN System and ASEAN

Bottom-up subsidiarity would have great difficulty being implemented in Southeast Asia because of ASEAN's inability to achieve collective action at the expense of state sovereignty. A look at the ASEAN and UN systems, however, reveals another constraint on the subsidiarity model: a few powerful states tend "to control the international system rather than to broaden, and thereby strengthen, participation in global problem solving."⁴⁷

Fear of Outside Domination

With the sole exception of Thailand, the Southeast Asian states are former colonies of Western powers. The ASEAN members have been apprehensive about great powers' foreign interference in their domestic affairs. ASEAN came into existence in the first place because the governments of these states faced domestic security problems and foresaw the need not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs. Consider the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which ASEAN called for in 1992. It is another example that reveals the fearfulness of major ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, about extraregional interference in their national and regional affairs.⁴⁸ ASEAN has resisted the political pressure from major Western states that demanded member governments to adopt democracy and respect human rights. At the twenty-ninth ministerial meeting in July 1996, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas defended ASEAN's "constructive policy" toward Myanmar, saying it is up to "the people of the countries themselves to decide what kind of democracy they want and not be dictated by the West."⁴⁹

ASEAN would not push hard for closer interinstitutional cooperation with the present UN, because it may fear the loss of national and regional autonomy. Articles 34 and 35 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter attest to the Security Council's overriding power: while Article 34 reserves the council's right to investigate any dispute that may endanger international peace and security, Article 35 refers to the UN members' right to bring their disputes to the attention of the council or General Assembly. Only the council enjoys the power of enforcement: "Article 53 makes it clear that no enforcement actions shall be taken by regional organizations without the authorization of the Security Council." In light of the UN Charter, regional organizations like ASEAN are to play a supportive or subordinate role within the UN system. It is also suggested that "the best partnership between the UN and regional organizations is for the UN to undertake enforcement action where necessary to contain or resolve disputes, whilst regional organizations undertake early warning, information gathering and preventive diplomacy."⁵⁰ The trouble with the council being the most powerful organ in the UN system is that the great powers control the decisionmaking process and have the right to define what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Problematic with this prerogative is when the great powers define threat in the context of their own security interests. Their interpretations of what constitutes threat have been "ad hoc . . . and inconsistent as has been the case in the early 1990s."⁵¹

Samuel Huntington's controversial "clash-of-civilizations" thesis should be placed in the context of power relations among states rather than simply in the light of cultural differences.⁵² According to Chan Heng Chee, a prominent Singaporean scholar and government official, the debate on

“Asian versus Western values” is not about differences between East and West but about the “universal” and the “particular,” where the Western powers want to universalize their own values to cover up their “cultural imperialism.”⁵³ This perceived vulnerability to outside domination comes from a long and bitter history of colonization by Western powers, and from the fact that the West continues to dominate international politics even in today’s world. It seems quite clear that ASEAN wants to develop ties with other international organizations only if the ties between them are built on the principle of partnership, not on the basis of domination.

Although ASEAN has depended on the UN as an instrument for helping to resolve regional problems and has never directly challenged the UN Charter and principles of international law, its members have in recent years become revisionist and demanded that the UN be restructured to minimize the great powers’ continued domination.⁵⁴ The dilemma facing the subsidiarity model is this: although ASEAN’s independent collective action has been rather limited—thus allowing the UN to assume a central role on an ad hoc basis—the association does not want a UN capable of intervening in the members’ domestic affairs either.

ASEAN for More UN Democratization

Fear of great-power domination is reflected in the ASEAN states’ express support for a more democratized UN. As a collective body, ASEAN has made it clear in recent years that the UN must be restructured from the top down to meet new challenges. The Singapore Declaration of 1992, for example, urges “the promotion of a *more equitable international political and economic order*, and for the *democratization* of the United Nations *decisionmaking processes* in order to make the organization *truly effective* in meeting its obligations.”⁵⁵ The Bangkok Summit of 1995 states that “ASEAN shall also work towards making the United Nations a *more equitable*, effective, and relevant body for promoting peace and prosperity in the region and globally in the post-Cold War era. ASEAN shall give particular attention towards the effort to making the membership of the Security Council *more reflective of the prevailing balance among nations*; to enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the world body to carry out its peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and preventive diplomacy function; and to strengthening the work of the United Nations in the social and economic fields.”⁵⁶

Although they have been unable to act in concert in pushing for UN democratic reform, individual ASEAN states have presented their own separate demands that the UN be more democratized. At the Forty-Eighth UN General Assembly, in October 1993, Singapore suggested how the UN could be reformed in response to the power configuration in international politics. During his speech at the UN, Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng

said that the expansion of UN membership demanded some restructuring within the UN system on the basis of equality among the member states. The key target for change should be the Security Council: "The great must seek the mandate of the many" to better reflect the current international distribution of power. A new Security Council "should entail the relegation of some from the elite as well as the anointment of others."⁵⁷

Both Indonesia and Malaysia have voiced stronger demands for more drastic UN reform to allow fairer representation in the world organization. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has contended that the Security Council needs to be expanded to better represent the interests of the current UN members. The last time the council was enlarged was in 1965 when there were only 113 member states. Since then, more states have become UN members, but the council's composition remains unchanged. Malaysia has been the most vocal ASEAN member on the issue of UN reform, particularly after the Cold War. At the UN General Assembly in 1993, Prime Minister Mahathir protested against the undemocratic nature of the UN system: "We talk of democracy as the only acceptable system of government. . . . Yet, when it comes to the UN, we eschew democracy. And the most undemocratic aspect of the UN is the veto power of the Permanent Five."⁵⁸

In spite of their desire to see the UN system become more democratized, the ASEAN states are unlikely to make any major contribution to the reform process. They are small powers and unable to achieve effective collective action. As shall be seen, the great powers are also unwilling to accept a less centralized or noncentralized UN system.

The Great Powers and Prospects for a Noncentralized UN System

The prospect of the Permanent Five being willing to share power with regional organizations does not look promising. Great powers also have a strong interest in maintaining or enhancing their prestige and position within the international political system. Although China is willing to accept some appropriate changes in the Security Council, it is not clear how much reform Beijing is willing to allow. Although China has consistently defended the developing world's demands for UN reform, it has never been enthusiastic about the kind of speed or pace suggested by smaller countries. Its emphasis on prudence, careful study, and negotiation among UN member states sheds much light on its desire to enhance its power status. It still considers effectiveness in the council's decisionmaking as important, despite its stress on the need to ensure better representation within the UN system. Chinese scholars generally contend that getting rid of the permanent members' veto power is not possible. They suggest only that those with veto power should take more responsibility for the maintenance

of international peace and security and should not abuse their veto power. According to a China specialist, Beijing can afford only rhetoric about defending the developing world. But when it comes to action or policy implementation, it does not see any benefits from doing that. China is not only a great and growing power interested in enhancing its position within the international political system, but it is still a communist or authoritarian state. The Chinese Communist Party has been unwilling to allow opposition parties or to tolerate liberal democracy. What this political attitude tells us is that it would be hard for the Chinese leadership to help democratize the UN system effectively. Also, China does not want Japan to become a permanent member in the Security Council. Many Chinese scholars and policymakers have said that Beijing remains silent about the prospect of Japan gaining a permanent seat.⁵⁹ Japan supports only the idea that the permanent membership in the council should be expanded from five to seven, with Japan and Germany as the new additions. Nonpermanent membership should be enlarged from ten to between thirteen and fifteen, to include members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Japan's official criteria for becoming a permanent member of the council seems to be restrictive, because its emphasis is on the exercise of global power in political and economic fields; that is, whoever pays the UN bills shall have the right to make decisions within the UN system.

Other permanent members, like the United States, do not seem to be keen on sharing power with other smaller states. One example of U.S. unwillingness to see the Security Council enlarged is the argument made by many U.S. policymakers that the council may become uncontrollable. Washington supports the idea of UN reform only to the extent that Japan and Germany become new permanent members and that three nonpermanent members, and more frequent opportunities for nonpermanent membership within the council, be added from the ranks of regional powers, like Indonesia. When Madeleine Albright visited Singapore in September 1995 as U.S. ambassador to the UN, she declared that her government was "open to the idea of allowing nonpermanent members to succeed themselves as a way of allowing important regional powers [i.e., Indonesia] to serve on the council more frequently." Washington did not, however, favor the idea that the council should be expanded from fifteen members to more than twenty, because "when it is too large, it becomes unwieldy."⁶⁰

In short, top-down subsidiarity will continue to face a major challenge in the UN-ASEAN context, because its ASEAN members still perceive themselves as vulnerable to outside domination and interference in their own domestic affairs. They cannot afford to abandon political sovereignty because they feel they have not even fully achieved it. Their pursuit of full sovereignty (still reflected in their domestic problems and their ongoing

vulnerabilities to outside interference) will make it difficult for them to act in concert and to welcome UN intervention in their national affairs when the global system remains as it is.

Conclusion

This study has shown that the subsidiarity model in the UN-ASEAN context will be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future. If Andy Knight's model were to be realized, at least three conditions would have to exist: (1) ASEAN must be materially competent and politically capable of taking collective action to deal with security crises without having to burden the UN; (2) the member states must recognize that the "time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed"; and (3) they must not perceive their vulnerabilities to great-power interference to be high; that is, the Permanent Five in the council must be more open to change and further democratization. Unfortunately, none of these conditions now exists. Nor is it ever likely to.

A few suggestions may be helpful, however, to advocates of the subsidiarity model. First, the UN may not need to shoulder all the burdens and try to meet every demand on earth. In many cases, neither regional organizations nor the UN can do much to manage or resolve security problems, especially when great powers are involved.⁶¹ Second, the UN may find it less burdensome to simply encourage regional organizations, especially those in the Third World, to learn from ASEAN. The "ASEAN way" has now served as the main pillar for the ASEAN Regional Forum. Although it has not always been successful in resolving domestic crises independently from the UN or in resolving most of their own territorial disputes, ASEAN has prevented its members from firing shots across their borders. Third, there is still hope for the subsidiarity model: although the ASEAN states refuse to forfeit their sovereign right to rule, many social forces exist that—in the future—will help to erode absolute and exclusive political sovereignty.⁶² Foreign investment in economic reconstruction, if ASEAN were to be seen as contributing to peace building, may need to be factored in and carefully studied. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), endorsed by the ASEAN leaders during their 1992 Singapore summit (twenty-five years after the grouping came into existence), will also help integrate the member states economically and galvanize regional integration in the coming decades. When that happens, the ASEAN states will be more willing and able to tackle collective action in fulfilling the subsidiarity model vision. Ultimately, however, if the model were to succeed in bringing relief to the UN overstretch problem, the UN system would need to be restructured to be less centralized than it is now. 🌐

Notes

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1. James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

2. W. Andy Knight, "Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational," *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1996): 49.

3. Knight's proposition rests on the premise that there is a need to move away from traditional approaches to international organizations and to "embrace a critical approach that recognizes that the UN system is merely one element in an historical structure." He sees the "modern era" as coming to an end, and the "post-modern one" beginning with the passage of "absolute and exclusive sovereignty" and the emergence of a "global village" in the context of complex interdependence and globalization. Knight, "Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy," p. 39.

4. There is no comprehensive study on UN-ASEAN cooperation. Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the initiative to organize three international workshops on ASEAN cooperation with the UN on peace and preventive diplomacy in 1993 and 1994. See Sarasin Viraphol and Werner Pfenning, eds., *ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Preventive Diplomacy* (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995); Amitav Acharya, "ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Peace and Preventive Diplomacy: Its Contribution to Regional Security," *Indonesia Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (third quarter 1994): 215-226; Jun Nishikawa, *ASEAN and the United Nations System* (New York: UN Institute for Training and Research, 1983).

5. Before ASEAN, other regional arrangements had failed, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), "Maphilindo" (Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia), and the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). See Norman D. Palmer, *The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1991).

6. Many scholars argue that democracies almost never fight each other. Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," *World Politics* 44, no. 4 (1992): 573-599; David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (1992): 24-37; Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). But democracy cannot be sustained without economic development. See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155-183.

7. See Viraphol and Pfenning, *ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Preventive Diplomacy*.

8. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America," *Third World Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (1994): 277-295; Paul Diehl, "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," *Armed Forces and Society* 19 (winter 1993), especially pp. 218-219; Stephen Baranyi, "Peace Missions and Subsidiarity in the Americas: Conflict Management in the Western Hemisphere," *International Journal* 50, no. 2 (spring 1995): 343-369.

9. Knight, "Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy," p. 41.

10. Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," in Michael Brown et al., eds, *East Asian Security* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 77.

11. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," in Brown et al., *East Asian Security*, pp. 3–30; Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," in Brown et al., *East Asian Security*, pp. 32–75.

12. Simon Sheldon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1982), p. 39.

13. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1991, p. 23.

14. T. Huxley, "ASEAN's Role in the Emerging East Asian Regional Security Architecture," in Ian G. Cook et al., eds., *Fragmented Asia: Regional Integration and National Disintegration in Pacific Asia* (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1996), p. 29.

15. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN: An Overview* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat 1995), p. 59.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

17. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 2 (October 1993): 204.

18. Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).

19. *Straits Times*, 16 February 1995, p. 17.

20. Council for the Development of Cambodia, *Development Cooperation Report, 1996/1997* (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board, May 1997), p. 12.

21. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN: An Overview*, p. 70.

22. Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995 (manuscript, 28 April 1997), p. 8.

23. Daniel Dhavernas, "Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement," in Viraphol and Pfenning, *ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Preventive Diplomacy*, pp. 65–66.

24. It may be worth noting that the Post-Ministerial Conference was institutionalized after the end of the Cold War by the ASEAN Regional Forum, which had its first meeting July 1994. The conference takes place immediately after the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

25. Jusuf Wanandi, *Asia Pacific After the Cold War* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp. 223–230.

26. Roger Uren, "ASEAN-UN Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy," in Viraphol and Pfenning, *ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Preventive Diplomacy*, pp. 18–19.

27. Khaw Guat Hoon, "ASEAN in International Politics," in Diane K. Mauzy, ed., *Politics in the ASEAN States* (Kuala Lumpur: Marican, 1984), pp. 225–263.

28. Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Subregional Resilience," in James W. Morley, ed., *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1986), pp. 111–143. When the ASEAN foreign ministers called for the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in Southeast Asia (widely known as ZOPFAN or the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971), security issues were not taken seriously. The declaration resulted from an ad hoc meeting.

29. Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 16, no. 2 (September 1994): 117.

30. Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 59.

31. Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC," in Brian Job, ed., *The Insecurity*

Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 143–166.

32. Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

33. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

34. According to one Singaporean scholar, ASEAN has been kept as powerless as possible:

35. See N. Ganesan, "Factors Affecting Singapore's Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1991): 182–195; Ganesan, "Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 21, no. 4 (winter 1995): 210–226.

36. This does not suggest that ASEAN is a lawless organization. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) does provide some sort of a code of conduct for the member states. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord suggests a "study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN extradition treaty" and calls for a "study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN." See Purification V. Quisumbing, "Problems and Prospects of ASEAN Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Dispute Settlement," in R. P. Anand and Purification V. Quisumbing, eds., *ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1981), pp. 300–318.

37. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1995/96* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

38. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), p. 299.

39. Scholars may disagree on whether Thailand or the Philippines is a better working democracy. According to Benedict Anderson, it is Thailand that "began to have elections well after they had been instituted in the American Philippines and the Dutch Indies, [and] has today the nearest approximation to Western-style bourgeois democracy," if only superficially. Benedict Anderson, "Elections and Participation in Three Southeast Asian Countries," in R. H. Taylor, ed., *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 32.

40. Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change* (Boulder: Westview, 1996). See also Kevin Hewison, Richard Robinson, and Garry Rodan, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism* (North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993).

41. Bilabari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," *Foreign Policy* 2 (fall 1993): 24–41.

42. Singapore president Ong Teng Cheong, for example, said in his speech at the UN's Fiftieth Anniversary Benefit Dinner in October 1995 that "the UN cannot guarantee the sovereignty and independence of small states." *Straits Times*, 25 October 1995, p. 3.

43. Garry Rodan, "State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore," in Rodan, ed., *Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 120, 121.

44. James Jesudason, "The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Opposition Politics in Malaysia," in Rodan, *Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia*, pp. 128, 157–158.

45. For more background on resistance to democratic reform, see Kevin Hewison, "Political Oppositions and Regime Change in Thailand," in Rodan, *Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia*, p. 90.

46. Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," in James Morley, ed., *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 40. Others have made similar observations, stating an alliance between the middle classes and the state. See Richard Robinson and David Goodman, *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1996).

47. Chadwick Alger, "Thinking About the Future of the UN System," *Global Governance* 2, no. 3 (Sept.–Dec. 1996): 345, 349.

48. Malaysia, which initiated the idea, called for the neutralization of Southeast Asia and urged the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to guarantee the region's stability. See Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975).

49. *Asiaweek*, 2 August 1996, p. 18.

50. Werner Pfenning, "Preventive Diplomacy, Humanitarian Intervention and Areas for ASEAN-UN Co-operation," in Viraphol and Pfenning, *ASEAN-UN Co-operation in Preventive Diplomacy*, p. 105.

51. Samuel Makinda, "Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations," *Global Governance* 2, no. 2 (May–Aug. 1996): 164.

52. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 22–49.

53. Chan Heng Chee, interviewed by the author, Singapore, May 1996.

54. It should be pointed out that the member states of ASEAN are small states in the global context and take their participation in the UN seriously. The UN provides small powers like them with, as one writer put it, an affordable access to the world's governments and gives them international respectability through international legitimacy. Roderic Alley, "The United Nations and Asia-Pacific: An Overview," *Pacific Review* 7, no. 3 (1994): 247.

55. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN: An Overview*, p. 70 (italics added).

56. ASEAN, *The Bangkok Summit Declaration, 1995*, p. 3 (italics added).

57. "Expanding the UN Security Council," statement by Wong Kan Sen, foreign minister of Singapore, at the Forty-Eighth United Nations General Assembly, 6 October 1993, p. 3.

58. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 November 1993, p. 36.

59. This is based on the author's discussions with Chinese scholars in the last few years.

60. *Straits Times*, 12 September 1995. On negative assessments of the Permanent Five's willingness to discuss their veto right, see Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann, "The Enlargement of the UN Security Council: The Question of Equitable Representation of and Increase in the Membership of The Security Council," *Australian Journal of Public and International Law* 47, no. 1 (1994): 1–16. See also Bruce Russett, Barry O'Neill, and James Sutterlin, "Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam," *Global Governance* 2, no. 1 (Jan.–Apr. 1996): 65–80. During the General Assembly meeting in September 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the member states to adopt his package reform, but key UN member states remain split over the expansion of the fifteen-seat Security Council. *Straits Times*, 24 September 1997, p. 4; *New Straits Times*, 18 September 1997, p. 22.

61. See, for instance, Robert Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter? *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (June 1978), especially pp. 207, 213, 211–212; Ernst Haas, "Regime Delay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945–1981," *International Organization* 37 (spring 1983): 189–256.

62. Garry Rodan, for instance, argues that “[significant] variations in the range and strength of social movements in the various East and Southeast Asian societies, and the relationships between social movements and political parties, represent a major force behind the different political trajectories unfolding in the region. These different trajectories, of course, will further expose the fallacy of the ‘Asian values’ emphasis on cultural commonality supposedly steering politics in the same general directions.” Rodan, “Theorizing Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia,” in *Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia*, p. 20. Harold Crouch and James Morley argue that the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have been trying to promote democracy in the “‘Asian style’ in which the national leadership is held in high esteem and opposition [is] muted” and that “what has happened or is happening in the most advanced of the Asia-Pacific economies appears not to be a transition to an inclusionary corporatism.” They continue, “Instead, it is transformation into a democracy—and a democracy that is not consensual but contestational in form, not ‘Asian’ but ‘Western.’” Harold Crouch and James Morley, “The Dynamics of Political Change,” in Morley, *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region*, pp. 305, 309. This is not to contradict the point raised earlier that the ASEAN countries are not rapidly becoming more democratic but to temper it with other assessments that indicate some hope for change in a distant future.