Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific

A Regional–Global Nexus?

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William T. Tow

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

8 Security community-building in the Asia-Pacific

Sorpong Peou

The 'pluralistic security community' concept as it applies in the Asia-Pacific region is based on the assumption that individual states can relate to one another more positively as their values and interests converge. In particular, the notion of a 'pluralistic' security community recently developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998: 30) of 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change' is examined. Concrete instances of viable regional security communities now exist around the world and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is arguably one such case (Acharya 2001). Political realists still question whether states will ever overcome historical or structural rivalries to eventually form a multilateral security community on a regional scale. Reconciling those interests that usually shape state-centric rivalries with norms and values that often serve as preconditions for underwriting the security community-building process is the key to overcoming those tensions that most often impede security communities from evolving.

History suggests that economic interests may help pacify relations among states. This material condition alone, however, remains insufficient for the building and maintenance of security communities (Bearce 2003; Nye 1988). Can states build security communities only when they share economic interests, as commercial pacifists and institutional functionalists (or regional integrationists) lead us to believe (Glosny 2006; Green and Self 1996; Rohwer 1995; Rosecrance 1986, 1999; Teo 2006; Tsunekawa 2005)? Some neo-classical realists even argue that weak states tend to 'bandwagon' with hegemons 'for profit' (Schweller 1994). A growing number of East Asian scholars and policy practitioners now seem to believe that this is the case. Some believe that even Japan may be 'ready to join the [Chinese] bandwagon' (Kruger 2002: 16). Zhang Yunling, head of the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies at China's Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, posits this argument bluntly: 'China's emergence is a fact. You can't reject it . . . for Asean, there is only one thing left: Figure out how to use this opportunity'

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(Laurence 2002: 15). President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines recently observed that 'engagement with China has been good for the Philippines and it has been good for [ASEAN]' (Greenlees 2006: 1). Other ASEAN state leaders also count on positive economic and commercial relations with China to succeed in community-building and to enmesh the Chinese gradually into a benign regional geopolitical framework (Goh 2005b). But questions remain. Does bandwagoning with China for profit help other regional states succeed in building pluralistic security communities? Are non-liberal hegemons such as China capable of compelling smaller states to jump on their economic bandwagons and to provide adequate leadership for this security enterprise?

It is argued here that liberal democracies have the most potential to succeed in transforming commercial interaction into more comprehensive security collaboration over time. The liberal norms they promote among themselves and project onto others serve as a powerful ideational force that nurtures a sense of 'community'.[1] The bridging of these norms with liberally oriented leadership further enhances pluralistic security community-building in a particular region. The United States adopted this premise in a post-Cold War context – and especially during the George W. Bush administration – to pursue the vision of a more liberal international security community binding different regions with common norms and values as its fundamental foreign policy objective. Historians have yet to make a final judgement on this quest. However, early indicators are that Asia-Pacific states have joined other groups of states around the world in condemning Washington for overstepping its liberal prerogative by applying force and raw power in lieu of more gradual normative instrumentalities to achieve its version of a liberal world order.

While some reference will be made in this chapter to US global aspirations to shape an international security community, most of the following analysis focuses on the Asia-Pacific dimension. Initially, commentary will be offered on how state 'typologies' – particularly those with democratic characteristics – link to factors of stability and peace that facilitate security community-building. The roles of liberal democratic norms and community leadership as key independent variables will be underscored and the 'liberal democratic peace' thesis will be assessed. The chapter then employs a 'case study' of what it argues is a potential 'Northeast Asian

[1] Democratic 'identity' may not be as strong as democratic 'norms'. Germany under Adolf Hitler, an elected and highly popular national leader well into the Second World War, did not share a sense of democratic identity with other Western democracies and then went to war against them.

security community' of democratic states based on a predominance of democratic principles and community leadership – the US–Japan bilateral security relationship. Although bilateral in a formal sense, the security community-building aspects of this relationship have become increasingly 'regionalised' since the end of the Cold War. They now constitute a potentially significant foundation for promoting Asia-Pacific security if it is managed in ways that avoid alienating Japan's neighbours (and especially China) during the interim.

A third section flows from this premise. Unless Asia-Pacific democracies such as the United States and Japan can identify more effective ways to shape and lead in implementing a *modus vivendi* on critical regional security issues with Beijing, the Korean peninsula and ASEAN, and until other major states become more democratic, there is little chance that a truly credible and enduring multilateral security community will emerge in this region along the lines envisioned by traditional security community proponents. It is appropriate to apply what is characterised here as 'democratic realist institutionalism' – based on liberal democratic norms (as opposed to national interests determined by rationalist state actors) and community leadership (provided by the most powerful democratic state within a security community, but not outside it or for non-democratic states) – as a preferred approach for initially accommodating and eventually integrating more autocratic political forces into the security community-building process.

Security communities

Before discussing how security community-building may relate to the Asia-Pacific and global security politics, the nature of those security actors most relevant to that process must be briefly identified and discussed. A growing literature on 'transnational security' has emerged over the past decade to complement the understandably strong obsession with international terrorism in a post-11 September world. States, however, continue to be the most critical unit of analysis in discussion about how security communities are envisioned and formulated. Neither al-Qaeda's vision of a transnational caliphate nor the perils of global climate change or pandemics that have generated greater calls for more coherent pan-regional policy responses by the United Nations or other inter-governmental organisations have yet matched the appeal or power of the state as an agent for affecting change in the contemporary international environment. Accordingly, the type of 'state-centric' groups that collaborate to form regional security communities is a critical aspect of overall international security politics.

In this context, the concept of anarchy as a core element of international security politics embodies three distinct groups of states that may bind for security cooperation: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (Wendt 1999). States conforming to the Hobbesian scenario of anarchy are prone to forge alliances of 'collective-defence'. The security challenges states face in this scenario remain deeply rooted in human ambitions and international anarchy; states supposedly exist in the 'state of nature', in which the 'war of all against all' applies. In this Darwinist world, only the 'fittest' states survive. Military power remains the most important means of national security and balance-of-power or military-alliance systems the basic mechanism for ensuring national survival (Mearsheimer 1998: 336). Alliances thus remain viable and intact as long as sovereign states still face the same enemy (Wendt 1999: 301).

States may alternatively form Lockean collective-security regimes. In Lockean arrangements, states have a more relaxed view of their national security. They do not treat each other as enemies, but as partners who are capable of entering into social contracts with each other to enhance the interests and prosperity of their respective sovereign populaces. As in the Hobbesian world, anarchy still exists. Lockean anarchy, however, is one characterised by international relations based on two basic norms: *self-help* and *mutual help*. In this model, states are seen as growing mature and more prosperous without conflict. They are less anxious about their national survival and thus more secure than those under Hobbesian anarchy. They also tend to be pro-status quo and only respond to others' threats defensively. State behaviour rests largely on the logic of 'live and let live' based on the premise that states are legitimate actors. War is no longer considered 'natural', but as something that is avoidable or at least manageable. States only balance against aggression, a behaviour judged 'bad' by international law. Power remains central to collective security, but is managed through international institutions, which operate differently from military alliances. The collective-security regime rests upon the preponderance of collective-power exercised by members of the international community (Kupchan and Kupchan 1998).

Kantian states can go beyond forming collective-defence and collective-security regimes to construct 'security communities'. States instead see one another as 'friends' or 'team players' whose collective norms – namely, non-violence and altruism – guide their mutual relations. Such communities usually emerge in one of two forms: 'amalgamated' or 'pluralistic'. States wishing to build an amalgamated security community develop a vision for common government. Members of such a security community forfeit their sovereignty in an effort to unify

themselves through the establishment of a formal supranational organisation. According to Karl Deutsch and his academic associates, an amalgamated security community results from the 'formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation' (Deutsch, Burrell and Kann 1957: 6). Proponents of this community type cite the historical example of how the United States came into existence and expect the European Union (EU) to become the United States of Europe. Yet, amalgamation is less frequent than pluralism as a core trait of security community-building because the act of conceding sovereign prerogatives calls for a greater degree of power relinquishment by states accustomed to being the final arbiters of authority and accountability in modern international systems.

The basic feature of a pluralistic security community is that its members retain their sovereignty but develop a sense of collective identity and mutual loyalty that makes war between them unthinkable. One of the positive signposts indicating mutual trust among security community members is border demilitarisation, even though this process does not necessarily require complete disarmament. If only ends military preparations for war between neighbours and signals their non-aggressive intentions towards each other. They also reduce material resources to defend against each other (Shore 1998: 344). Members of such communities are not set completely free from pursuing any autonomy or competition for power or leadership among themselves. In this context, the term 'pluralistic military security community' is a more accurate descriptor, because states mainly develop reliable expectations for peaceful change in the military context.

Nor does it mean that such communities are bound to last unless at least two important conditions are met. These are, I argue, liberal democratic norms and community leadership. They constitute the two key independent variables for shaping an enduring pluralistic security community. A cultural identity shared by non-democratic or illiberal states may be helpful in facilitating a sense of cultural community (Huntington 1996; Kang 2003/04), but this expectation by itself remains far from sufficient. The question remains as to whether shared liberal norms meet the requirements for states to build and maintain clearly viable security communities. Alexander Wendt, among others, remains agnostic about whether Kantian or republican states are the only types of state that can internalise liberal norms of the democratic peace (Wendt 1999: 297). For him, 'self-restraint is the ultimate basis for collective identity and friendship [and] that the latter are rooted fundamentally ... in respecting each other's difference' (Wendt 1999: 360).

But it remains difficult to sustain the argument that non-democratic states can effectively exercise self-restraint when their autocratic leaders tend to rely upon repressive means or apply such norms to the extent that help transform their institutions, such as military alliances, into security communities. I thus argue that 'community' is based not only on self-interest, but also on collective identity based on liberal norms. Non-liberal democratic states may cooperate with each other, but their form of cooperation is less likely to last and tends to conform to the Hobbesian logic of *self-interest* and *self-help*. Liberal democratic and non-democratic states can also enhance their cooperation based on the Lockean logic of *mutual interest*. Yet only liberal democracies can build and maintain genuine security communities, because of their shared liberal norms.

Non-democratic states may try to build 'pluralistic security communities' based on such norms as mutual tolerance and non-violence. The empirical evidence demonstrates, however, that these events have not been very successful. Non-democratic states in the Arab world, for instance, made efforts to form alliances among themselves based on 'pan-Arabism', but their collective identity was relatively weak. Heads of Arab states 'routinely paid lip service to the [non-democratic] ideals of pan-Arabism while engaging in power-seeking behavior' (Barnett 1996: 401). Pan-Arabism was supposed to give rise to a political community that defends Arabs wherever they may reside, works towards political unification and strengthens the bonds of Arab unity. Non-democratic states in the Arab world have sought to build security arrangements based on their norms of non-violence, consultation and compromise. But no one has ever considered any of their regional groups, most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council, as a genuine security community.

Concrete examples of security communities whose member states contain a mixture of democratic and non-democratic regimes are still largely absent. This at last partially explains why the two types of states may form security regimes, but do not identify each other as long-lasting or close friends or members of a security community. The dyadic democratic model shows that liberal democratic states do not really trust autocratic states or their military allies that are not democratic. If both types of states are in a major crisis, liberal democracies may not even seek compromise through negotiation (Rousseau *et al.* 1996). One obvious reason is that liberal democracies are no less prone to war against non-democratic states than the latter, which also have a strong record of waging war against each other. When disputes between liberal democracies and autocracies arise, the former may even escalate the ongoing tensions with the latter and initiate military hostilities against them (Dixon 1994: 18).

The 'liberal democratic peace' thesis has captured the attention of international relations theorists as an explanation for war avoidance and state-centric collaboration (Doyle 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1996a, 1996b), based on such liberal norms as mutual tolerance, non-violence and peaceful conflict resolution. Jack Levy (1989: 270) asserts that this theory is 'as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations'. Even some leading realists acknowledge that it has a positive impact on liberal democracy. Stephen Walt (1995: 229), for instance, concurs that 'the extraordinary absence of warfare between democratic or republican regimes suggests that their domestic orders help reduce conflicts between them as well'. Barry Buzan (1991a: 50–1) also views the norm of consensus on the need to avoid war and on economic liberalism as giving rise to security communities. The main strength of liberal internationalism lies in its empirical ability to prove that members of regional security communities have adopted liberal democracy and that non-democratic states have so far failed to form such communities or maintain them.

Various studies show that 'alliances between democracies . . . appear to be more durable' (Gaubatz 1996: 135), while others demonstrate that international security regimes with non-liberal members are less robust than those with liberal democratic members (Slaughter 1995; Slaughter Burley 1993). Democracies 'perceive each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making processes' (Risse-Kappen 1996: 371) and thus tend to resolve their disputes in a manner short of war (Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992). Two of the most important mechanisms for doing this are peaceful dispute settlement (non-recourse to war, negotiation and compromise) and legal equality (voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity) (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994). Among themselves, liberal states that adopt the norm of self-restraint and non-violence tend to favour negotiation and compromise. They are highly institutionalised and thus tend to rely on *legal* means as the way to resolve conflict (Raymond 1994: 24).

Liberal democratic norms *per se* do not automatically turn states into security communities, however. Indeed, there is evidence that democratic states have almost gone to war against each other (Layne 1994). Some constructivists have added another variable: liberal-social processes of mutual recognition and respect among democracies (William 2001). From this author's perspective, the liberal norms of self-restraint and non-violence may prove important in the process of security community-building among democracies, but norms relatively more capable of promoting mutual trust among democratic states are the liberal values

of political and racial equality (major elements of modern liberalism). Democratic state leaders who treat other states, including democracies, as politically or racially inferior do not have a clean record of self-restraint and non-violence.

For democratic norms to be observed effectively, they must also enjoy the support of powerful states that are democratic. This point goes beyond hegemonic stability theory proposed by neo-classical realists (Gilpin 1981; Wohlforth 1999). John Ikenberry (2001) has argued that liberal hegemonies help institutionalise and stabilise international politics. Other leading constructivists believe material power matters, although they emphasise the positive images of powerful states, which helps explain the existence of Kantian communities. They view 'the development of a security community' as 'not antagonistic to the language of power; indeed, it is *dependent on* it' (Adler and Barnett 1998: 52, emphasis added). Another constructivist, Martha Finnemore (1996: 30), further contends that 'norms, rules and routines . . . will serve the interests of powerful actors; they will not survive long if they do not'. A leading political realist, Walt (1998: 43), also notes that 'constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces'.

Because of their shared liberal norms and values (such as self-restraint and tolerance), democracies – whether powerful or weak – may cooperate with one another more effectively than autocracies. A powerful democracy tends to enjoy more legitimacy with other democracies than a powerful autocracy with weaker autocracies. This is because political leaders within *any* democracy tend to enjoy political legitimacy from their populations. Powerful democracies may find it easier to deal with other democratic states than with non-democratic ones and are thus more willing and able to provide community leadership. Security communities can be maintained on the basis of such legitimacy.

One may wonder if a security community with more than one great power is less durable than one led by one single power. Reese (2006: 11) contends that 'the most stable possible situation for a security community would be to have a single great power among its membership'. This seems to be a reasonable proposition: security community-building requires a powerful liberal democracy capable of playing the role of a regional community leader (Peou 2001). However, security communities involving multiple great powers and weaker ones may not be as volatile as Reese surmises and may not implode over the long run, if all of the member states remain democratic. If democracies continue to engage in the power-balancing game within security communities, they may help maintain rules of the 'democratic game' if none is capable of

defying them. Balance-of-power politics among democracies may thus be stabilising (Peou 2007: 214; Raymond 1994: 29–30).

Power transition among liberal democracies should also be generally peaceful. One fundamental liberal norm in electoral politics is peaceful transfer of power between the incumbent and challenger. Evidence shows the same trend of leadership change among liberal democracies. On the one hand, this might be attributed to liberal democracies' orientation towards supporting the status quo: namely, they enjoy more satisfaction with their positions than non-democracies in the contemporary international system, which tend to be revisionist (Brawley 1993; Kacowicz 1995; Rousseau et al. 1996). Other studies show that rising democracies prove less likely to escalate war against leading democracies, or even less likely than autocracies to become revisionist, and thus less likely to challenge the status quo (Huth and Allee 2003). Even realists who normally regard anarchy and war as the natural state of things suspect that this may be the case (Buzan 1991a: 36; Wohlforth 1999: 34). On the other hand, leading democracies on the decline prove far less likely than declining autocracies to wage preventive wars (Schweller 1992: 238). Together, leading and rising democracies make their power transition less prone to war – contrary to what some realists assume (that is, when challenged from below, hegemons resort to preventive war).[2]

Several caveats regarding the notion of democratic community leadership must be underscored here. First, the arguments above only apply to democratic members within security communities. Powerful democracies do not necessarily enjoy political legitimacy among non-democratic states and may be unable to lead them. Second, democracies may still pursue different non-military interests when dealing with states outside their communities. Third, the strongest democratic state within a security community may still invite counter-'hegemonic' politics as political realists tend to suggest (Waltz 1962). However, the exercise of power by the leading democracy would generate much less of such balancing. In other words, power-balancing within security communities will not disappear completely but are far less prone to war. Adler (1997: 255)

2   According to realists, history shows that power transition among great powers appears to be dangerously prone to war. Robert Gilpin (1981: 209), for instance, observes that 'there do not appear to be any examples of a dominant power willingly conceding dominance over an international system to a rising power in order to avoid war. Nor are there examples of rising powers that have failed to press their advantage and have refrained from attempts to restructure the system to accommodate their security and economic interests.' However, Gilpin makes a subtle but profound remark about the difference between the United States, viewed as 'tolerant' and 'un-oppressive' and Germany. Great powers that operate on the basis of 'shared values and interests' account for peaceful change.

makes clear that 'the existence of security communities does not mean that interest-based behavior by states will end, that material factors will cease to shape interstate practices, and that security dilemmas will end'. Neither should anyone else believe that members of security communities will be completely set free from balance-of-power/threat politics.

In short, this chapter softens political realism by incorporating insights from democratic (or Kantian) liberalism and social constructivism, but questions the more radical type of constructivism that rejects liberalism and celebrates difference (Möller 2003). As discussed in the following section, radical constructivism (or postmodernism) proves unhelpful when contending that pluralistic security communities can be established even if states and societies do not share any liberal democratic norms and even if there are no core liberal states to provide community leadership.

Japan and the United States: a dyadic security community?

If the criteria discussed above are applied consistently, it may be concluded that the Japan–US security alliance has now evolved into a pluralistic military-security community. Sceptics may find this thesis unconvincing, because they still regard the US–Japan security relationship as more of a traditional military alliance than a security community. In their view, the bilateral military alliance is maintained because it is still based on a shared perception of a common threat to their national security and will collapse when the threat disappears. David Rapkin (2001: 399), for instance, argues that 'US and Japanese interests have never been entirely harmonious, but the security exigencies of the Cold War placed a premium on suppressing parochial interests to ensure cooperative solutions.' He adds that, 'absent such motivation to subordinate conflicts of interest, the cooperative basis of the relationship – and thus also the political foundations for any sort of shared leadership – has deteriorated'.

Others also argue that Japan has now actively sought to enhance its national autonomy by hedging American constraints on its foreign policy or by reducing the risks of US entrapment within the context of military bilateralism. According to T.J. Pempel (2004: 29), 'after the many trade frictions of the mid- to late-1980s, Japan was anxious to reduce its dependence on the United States and also on those global multilateral organizations in which US influence was overwhelming'. Both Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima (2004: 60) observe that Japanese multilateralism clearly serves as an option that proves 'capable of countering exclusive security dependence on the United States'. Japanese multilateralism thus seems to further ensure greater Japanese independence from

the United States, which tends to favour multilateralism in the context of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

A counter-argument to those who insist US and Japan bilateral relations are only an alliance as opposed to a security community does exist. A 'community' does not require multilateralism as one of its preconditions if a single great power interacts with another state in ways consistent with other security community characteristics. Japan can be regarded as a new, if not a mature, security community partner of the United States because: (1) it is evolving towards 'normal power' status in the aftermath of the Cold War; and (2) its interactions with the United States spill over to have both regional and global ramifications on their own merits rather than as primarily a response to a mutually perceived threat. Even realist-inclined scholars have now acknowledged the presence of a bilateral security community in which Japan and the United States are members, although they tend to couple the US–Japan dyad into a larger transregional context to include Europe. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (1998: 109), for instance, have observed that 'the Atlantic community and Japan have established an interdependent security community' (see also Reese 2006: 29–32). The US–Japan security dyad constitutes a powerful component of what was originally known as the 'Trilateral Commission' but which has more recently found expression with Japan as a key Pacific contact country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) consultative mechanisms for managing its approaches to contemporary global security challenges (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006: 106; Zoellick, Sutherland and Owada 1999).

Although Japan and the United States arguably transferred this alliance to a pluralistic military-security community in recent years, it does not mean that it is now a mature one. Although a democracy, Japan has become noticeably more 'liberal' only in the 1990s and is still not as liberal as the United States. Japan is known for having embraced 'developmental statism', which is not compatible with the type of laissez-faire capitalism found in the United States, and Tokyo even sought to block trade and investment liberalisation in the East Asian region (Rapkin 2001). Divergent or competing economic interests may still continue among members of a pluralistic military-security community, of course, and such a community still exists as long as the member states do not engage in military competition against one another.

A recent trend in US–Japan security community-building is the incremental or low-key expansion of the dyadic core to include a wider spectrum of strategic partnerships based on commonly held democratic values. The Australia–Japan–US Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) is

a case in point. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, moreover, sought throughout 2006–7 to promote a quadrilateral security dialogue with Australia, India and the United States and even proposed the establishment of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (although it did not materialise). Japan's *Diplomatic Bluebook 2007* in particular calls for the strengthening of strategic partnerships with other liberal democracies, such as Australia and India (Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). When he took office in September 2007, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda further sought to strengthen the US–Japan alliance. All this runs contrary to the prediction by structural realists that Japan is more likely to balance against US power by joining other less powerful states such as China because of their shared perception of a common threat from the most powerful state in the international system.

Why both Japan and the United States can now be considered a security community can thus be explained in different ways. Reese suggests that material power alone matters exclusively. For instance, he makes a realist prediction that when Japan becomes a normal great power, its new status will alter the US–Japan security community: 'Japan is beginning to assert a new identity resembling that of a normal great power. If this transformation does take place, the future of this [security community] relationship is unlikely to resemble the past' (Reese 2006: 32). In other words, 'this [dyadic security] community will begin to rupture' (Reese 2006: 33). Although they do not touch on the two states in the context of a bilateral security community, Buzan and Wæver also make the case that these two states would have to have developed a generalised fear of 'back to the future' (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 353), as well as 'a strong shared view of the status quo, a shared culture and/or well-developed institutions'. In their view, 'democracy may not be a necessary condition but, as suggested by the democracy and peace literature (and by the empirical cases to date), it is a huge asset' (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 173). Some social constructivists also question the effects of democratic norms on the social process of security community-building. They imply that if the US–Japan alliance has indeed become a security community, it is primarily because the two states have engaged in the process of socialisation. They thus stress the importance of informal and formal dialogue between leaders of the two states as an effective way to change preferences and interests (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02: 181).

These explanations have some merit, but still leave open why security community members can effectively develop a strongly shared view of the status quo as well as a shared culture and/or well-developed institutions. In this context, democratic states can meet these conditions much better than non-democratic ones. If the EU and NATO have been transformed

into security communities, it is because their member states had first become democratic. Moreover, as explained earlier, democratic states also tend to favour the status quo, to share liberal cultural values or norms, and to develop complex state, political and civil society institutions. Socialisation may also help develop a collective sense of community, but socialisation among democracies is likely to achieve this result far better than that among autocracies.

Two key independent variables help explain why: namely, democracy and the role of the United States as leader of their security alliance. Both Japan and the United States initially shared a common perception of the Soviet threat during the Cold War and the potential threat of China in more recent years. But sharing common perceptions of Soviet, Chinese and North Korean threats alone would not build a sense of community between both Japan and the United States. However, liberal democracy clearly does have pacifying effects on the two democratic states' mutually directed policy behaviour. One may observe that Japan has never been a true liberal democracy. By and large, however, most observers accept the fact that Japan has (since the end of the Cold War) now become more liberal in its democratic politics. Recent events, including the Japanese Opposition Party's capture of power in the upper house of Japan's Diet, attest to the growing robustness of that country's political democracy.

There is a qualitative difference of policy behaviour between Japanese decision-makers before and after the Second World War, especially after the end of the Cold War. Before that conflict, Japanese military and civilian leaders may have reached consensus on the need for total war (Snyder 1991), but did not share strong democratic norms with American leaders. Since the end of the Second World War, especially after the end of the Cold War, Japanese and American citizens and their elites have regarded their countries as friendly allies, rather than strategic rivals or adversaries. By and large, Americans and Japanese have learned to regard each other in a positive light. In spite of evidence indicating some Japanese resentment of US externally directed policies (such as the US war on terrorism, which enjoyed the support of only 26 per cent of Japanese respondents in 2006, down from 61 per cent in the summer of 2002), a poll by the Pew Research Center released in June 2006 still shows that only 29 per cent of Japanese respondents perceived the United States as a danger to world peace and 82 per cent of them gave the American people 'favorable marks', up from 73 per cent in 2002' (Pew Research Center 2006: 11).[3]

[3] According to one Japanese scholar, 'The United States has been by far the most favorite country of the Japanese, except at the height of the Vietnam War when Switzerland, with a peaceful image, ranked number one' (Agakimi 2006: 3).

For their part, 66 per cent of American respondents favoured Japan, up from 63 in May 2005 and 62 in August 1998 (Pew Research Center 2006: 34).

Japanese and American officials have also maintained close political and military ties; indeed such ties have been increasingly cordial over the past decade (with the relationship between President Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi highly illustrative).[4] It is now viewed as a matter of course that Japan's head of government will attend and interact meaningfully at most important Asia-Pacific and international summits and will be among those first consulted when the US initiates military interventions or other exercises of 'hard power'. Japan's support for such ventures is 'expected' by Washington, but is hardly taken for granted.

Democratic community leadership defined in political, economic and military terms has also been critical to the recent development of the bilateral US-Japan pluralistic security community. The contrast that can be drawn before and after the Second World War is stark. Japanese militarism in the 1930s eroded the new liberal democratic norms defined by Woodrow Wilson's Nineteen Points and eventually pushed Japan into aggressive action and the Second World War. The postwar US occupation gave rise to what both John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990: 304) call 'internal reconstruction', helping turn Japanese militarism into pacifism and authoritarianism into democracy through military, political and social reforms.

Japan's military dependence on the United States has therefore remained substantial in the postwar era and into the present time. This condition, however, actually underwrote the process of security community-building between these two states. Japan's military dependence on the United States remains indispensable for its security. Tokyo continues to finance the US military presence (over $4 billion per year) and spends annually an additional $1.5 billion on other security activities, such as having deployed its troops in Iraq in support of the US forces. This does not suggest that Japan's reliance on the United States is totally subservient. In 2006, Japan withdrew its troops from Iraq. It maintains positive ties with Iran and tense relations with South Korea (America's other main Northeast Asian ally). But Japan continues to be strategically dependent on the United States for its own national security.

Japan may now be on its way to becoming a normal great power, but the US-Japan security community is likely to remain durable. Reese's

[4] According to Jitsuro Terashima (2006: 2), honorary chairman of the non-profit Japan Research Institute, 'The Koizumi Cabinet has been an unprecedented pro-American administration.'

prediction – that Japan as a normal great power will cause the US–Japan security community to disintegrate – could well turn out to be true. As noted, balancing behaviour continues among member states within security communities. It is surmised here that this bilateral security community may become less stable when Japan becomes a normal great power and seeks to enhance a policy position more independent from that of the United States, but will still survive as long as the two states remain democratic. Less asymmetrical power relations represented by Japan's gradual emergence as a 'normal power' pursuing explicit strategic interests more independently could ironically lead the US–Japan dyad to become a more explicit security community in the long run. This is because Japanese defence burden-sharing in future contingencies where US power is applied to strengthen democratic norms will become increasingly valued in Washington.

A key question here is whether any further strengthening of the US–Japan security community dyad can 'spill over' into neighbouring regional sectors. Whether the United States can bring South Korea on board to develop a trilateral security community, for example, remains highly doubtful given recent South Korean overtures to reach out to its North Korean neighbour and the intensification of nationalism in that country. The 2006 missile tests by North Korea put both Japan and South Korea on different paths. One reason lies in the fact that South Koreans tend to see North Koreans as 'long-lost brethren, objects of pity, sources of kitsch, or targets of ridicule – but rarely enemies' (*International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 2006: 3) and prefer reconciliatory options. Japan, however, has wanted tougher actions, including the possibility of pre-emptive strikes on North Korea, which infuriated Seoul.[5] The recent initiative to forge a TSD between Australia, Japan and the US, however, may have more significant long-term implications for community-building, given the three affiliates' common democratic values and marketing interests (Tow *et al.* 2007).

An Asia-Pacific security community: possibility or pipe dream?

That states in the Asia-Pacific have not yet formed a security community can be explained by the absence of consensus on key democratic norms,

5 On 11 July 2006, a spokesperson of President Roh Moo Hyun responded in anger, assailing Tokyo in the following words, 'We will strongly react to arrogance and senseless remarks of Japanese political leaders who intend to amplify a crisis on the Korean peninsula with dangerous and provocative rhetoric such as pre-emptive strikes . . . [which] exposed Japan's tendency to invade' (Choe 2006: 3).

such as self-restraint, peaceful conflict resolution, equality, consent and compromise. Evidence exists that the presence of non-democratic states and lack of democratic community leadership make it extremely difficult for states to create a security community.

It would be unfair to make the argument that non-democratic states in the region have never adopted any liberal norms. Some constructivists would remind us that ASEAN adopted these norms, even though only a few of them have become truly 'democratic'.[6] Still, they have yet to form a genuine security community. This does not undermine the reality that ASEAN has made some positive moves towards doing so in recent years. In 2003, the ASEAN leaders adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II or Bali Concord II, which includes the concept of an ASEAN security community. The regional group further adopted the Vientiane Action Programme 2003–10 to help realise this vision and institutionalised an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting to improve cooperation in the field of defence and security. On 9 May 2006, ASEAN held the inaugural meeting of its defence ministers in Kuala Lumpur and then convened the first ASEAN Defence Ministers Retreat on 23–25 March 2007, in Bali. An ASEAN Charter, embodying majority voting formulas and other liberal principles for managing that organisation, was ratified by all members during 2008.

Although ASEAN may have become a 'nascent security community' as Amitav Acharya (2001) contends, most observers still do not characterise the regional group as a security community. Kavi Chongkittavorn (2007: 9), a leading journalist in Thailand (who used to work at the ASEAN Secretariat), recently made the following observation: 'It is doubtful if ASEAN can realize its plan to establish the security community . . . by 2015 as planned.' He offers one major reason for this challenge: the ASEAN leaders have yet to agree 'on what kind of dispute settlement mechanisms' will apply. He then adds that, 'while the dispute settlement mechanisms in the economic arena are already in place, those related to security, social and cultural issues are harder to formulate.'

The lack of optimism regarding the future potential of ASEAN as a genuine regional pluralistic security community has less to do with the limits of socialisation among the member states within the group, but more to do with the extreme fragility of what democratic institutions they have developed. The 'ASEAN way' has so far proved inadequate in

6 States within APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN have often been divided on democratic and human rights issues. Within APEC, the democratic members include Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States, and, arguably, Thailand. The rest are either semi-democratic or fully anti-democratic.

terms of helping transform the group into a stable regional security community. Ali Alatas, Indonesia's most famous foreign minister, recently conceded that ASEAN leaders have never been 'short of good ideas'. But in his view, 'it is their implementation' that is the problem. Beneath the ASEAN inability to implement 'good ideas' lies one persistent fact: ASEAN leaders still do not have a 'regional mindset' due to their fear of a loss of national identity. He further acknowledged that the 'different political systems' made it difficult for ASEAN leaders to 'push for political convergence' (*AsiaViews*, July–August 2007: 14, 15).

Hostility and tension between non-democratic and democratic states have so far hindered ASEAN members from intensifying their security community-building. ASEAN is no longer quite a 'club of dictators', as it has often been labelled by its critics, but only three ASEAN states – Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (before the military coup on 19 September 2006, which temporarily put Thai democracy on hold) – can be considered democracies. Indonesia is still consolidating its democratic gains. Cambodia remains a poor candidate for consolidated democracy. Malaysia and Singapore are semi-authoritarian or electoral autocracies. Brunei remains an absolute monarchy. Myanmar remains under the thumb of its military junta. Laos and Vietnam claim to uphold Marxism-Leninism. With Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia becoming more democratic and a number of autocratic states joining ASEAN, the political rift between the two types of states apparently widened.

More centrally, the non-democratic states in ASEAN still pose a powerful challenge to the process of turning the group into a security community. The member states have formally agreed to establish a human rights commission, but this came after much disagreement among them and there is still no clear timeframe for its implementation. The September 2007 violent crackdowns on protesters in Myanmar by the junta government, for instance, further complicated regional efforts to build collective or shared norms among the ASEAN states. Differences between the democratic and non-democratic members have narrowed only slightly. They still regard each other as rivals.

Beyond ASEAN, non-democratic (including socialist) states have been no more successful – and arguably less so – than their Western counterparts in maintaining, much less building, military alliances or security communities. The military alliances between socialist states in East Asia – most notably the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam – did not out-last the Cold War. The Russian–Vietnamese military alliance formed in the late 1970s has now ceased to exist. No new military alliances between socialist states have emerged, although the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation may yet become one. Vietnam behaves more or less

according to balance-of-threat logic (against China) by moving closer to the more powerful democracy (the United States) rather than according to balance-of-power logic, which predicts that Vietnam would form a military alliance with China to balance the preponderance of US power.

Still much evidence from the Asia-Pacific further suggests that non-democratic states have been prone to challenge militarily powerful democracies, even with little expected benefits from war. The Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and intermittent crises in the Taiwan straits all illustrate this point. Non-democratic states have since continued to distrust and resist democratic ones. The 1996 Taiwan strait confrontation precipitated by Chinese pressure against nationalist Taiwanese politicians and the 2006 nuclear launches by North Korea directed against Japan and its hostilities towards the United States further confirm that non-democratic states are at least as likely to initiate crises or the use of military force against democratic states. China, in particular, remains deeply resentful of Western attempts to promote a 'peaceful evolution' within its sovereign or national boundaries. China's ongoing support for highly autocratic regimes in Myanmar and North Korea, serious challenges to democratic institutions in Thailand and in the Indochinese states, and even still strong security dilemmas between Malaysia and Singapore – states where one political party has long dominated internal politics – all attest to the outstanding barriers impeding stronger linkages between democracy and community-building.

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia in particular, and the Asia-Pacific region in general, continues to show a serious lack of community leadership. ASEAN still has the potential to transform itself into a multilateral security community, if Indonesia proves itself capable of leading the way. A young but unstable democracy, that country – the largest ASEAN state that used to provide de facto leadership – has begun to move in this direction. Since it became more democratic in the late 1990s, Indonesia has, through ASEAN auspices, taken the initiative to build a security community in this region. However, it still faces serious domestic problems that prevent it from becoming the leading regional power. In spite of its desire to solidify its position in the driver's seat in the process of regional community-building in East Asia, therefore, ASEAN has proved unable to provide leadership. As a group of small and middle powers, ASEAN simply cannot expect to lead other greater powers, most notably China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

Within the broader Asia-Pacific region, the United States also has never made a serious effort to build a regional security community apart from cultivating the aforementioned US–Japan bilateral relationship. One

reason for this may have much to do with its historical and cultural treatment of Asian societies (arguably due to the persistent lack of shared liberal democratic values within this region) (Duffield 2001; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for instance, American decision-makers developed patronising attitudes towards Asian polities, many of which were still struggling with the throes of European colonisation until after the Second World War. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein link this sense of cultural superiority to an explanation of why there is no NATO or a multilateral security community in Asia, arguing persuasively that American policy-makers did not treat their Asian allies on equal terms (political, cultural or racial). 'America's potential Asian allies . . . were seen as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior community' (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 575; Duffield 2001). European allies were identified by US policy-makers as trustworthy, because of their shared religion, democratic values and common race. In contrast, the norm of cultural, religious and racial inequalities identified by 'condescending' US policy-makers led many of them not to regard 'Asians as ready or sufficiently sophisticated to enjoy the trust and the same degree of power that the United States had offered to European states' or not to 'take them very seriously' or even to 'regard them as inferiors' (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 597, 598). As a consequence, American leaders until recently took East Asia far less seriously than Europe. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for instance, 'visited Europe at least eleven times', but claimed that he was 'too busy to make even a single visit to East Asia' (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 597).

Until China and other autocratic regimes become more democratic and liberal, the United States will be both unwilling and unable to provide leadership for regional security community-building. The Bush administration's 2006 *National Security Strategy* perhaps unconsciously demonstrates this: 'Asian nations that share our values can join us in partnership to strengthen new democracies and promote democratic reforms throughout this region. This institutional framework, however, must be built upon a foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in the region' (cited in Cossa 2007a: 4). This seems to imply that US leadership depends on the sharing of democratic values, as well as the willingness of other democracies to follow.

Evidence further shows that non-liberal democratic hegemons in the Asia-Pacific have done much worse than liberal democratic ones: the former, for instance, have never contributed to security community-building in East Asia. The region has a long history of alternation between anarchy and (non-democratic) hegemony (Gills 1993). In ancient China, there

were 3,790 recorded wars from the Western Zhou (c. 1100 BC) to the end of the Qin dynasty (1911). In the Ming period, the average number of external wars per year was 1.12 (Johnston 1995: 27). After having achieved unification during the Qin and Han dynasties, China became expansionist when its emperor began to incorporate the 'barbarians' of present-day southern China down to Guangzhou (Canton) and to the northern part of contemporary Vietnam. China occupied Korea (108 BC–AD 313) and Vietnam for about 1,000 years (from 111 BC to AD 939). The Chinese Empire maintained regional stability for hundreds of years (from approximately 1300 to 1900 AD) and did so by exerting both material and cultural influence. The Chinese world order was pre-served for centuries by the strength of the Chinese civilisation as well as by military force (Zhao 1997: 19, 23). China was a 'world empire' without rivals in the region for many centuries, with Chinese leaders characterising those whom they subjugated as 'barbarian' or inferior.[7]

States under Chinese suzerainty, however, did not unconditionally accept Chinese illiberal hegemony and this legacy helps explain why the idea of a security community in an intra-regional context remains so elusive.[8] There is certainly no evidence suggesting that this suzerainty system helped build a security community. Japan, for instance, sought to escape from the Chinese sphere of influence and even waged war to do so in 1895. Its decision to enter the Western world was driven by the need to counter the China-centred tributary system.[9] Paying tribute to the Chinese emperor was seen by Japan as 'a sign of submission'. Japan's absorption of Western technology and its drive for modernization rested on the need to cope with Chinese influence. According to Takeshi Hamashita (1997: 129), 'the course of Japan's modernization has been studied as a process of overcoming its subordination to Western powers'.

[7] Ming China's elites (1368–1644), for instance, regarded the Mongols as racially inferior, calling them "dogs and sheep"; "not of our race", who 'should be 'rejected as animals'" (Johnston 1995: 187).

[8] David Kang argues that they did. He cites David Marr: ""This reality [China's overwhelming size], together with sincere cultural admiration, led Vietnam's rulers to accept the tributary system"" (Kang 2003/04: 174–5). Japan's leaders, such as ""The Tokugawa rulers tacitly acknowledged Chinese supremacy and cultural leadership in the East Asian world"" (Kang 2003/04: 175, citing Key-Hiuk Kim). Then, however, he provides evidence suggesting that Japan did seek to balance Chinese power when the latter weakened: 'Centuries later, as the Ming dynasty began to weaken, the Japanese general Hideyoshi twice attempted to invade China through Korea (in 1592 and 1598)' (Kang 2003/04: 175–6).

[9] The Sino-centric tributary system was of a mercantilist nature. Tributary states had resisted Chinese hegemony, long before the Opium War, and subsequently adopted Westphalian international principles and methods and turned them against China (Hamashita 1997: 117).

But 'the main issues in Japanese modernization were how to cope with Chinese dominance over commercial relations in Asia' and 'how to reorganize relations among Japan, China, Korea, and Liu-chi'u (Ryukyu) in a way that put Japan at the center' (Hamashita 1997: 128).

A more democratic China would not challenge regional peace and stability as does the current undemocratic version. While there is no concrete evidence to predict how a democratic Chinese state would behave and how other states would respond, we have better evidence to suggest that democratic Chinese leadership would be more acceptable to democratic states than autocratic leadership. The region-wide shock to events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 crushed the widespread hope that China's democratic forces might prevail as generational change swept that country. The old veterans of the Long March and the Chinese civil war who constructed the front ranks of Chinese military autocracy ultimately prevailed. Taiwan has made it clear it will not willingly be absorbed by a Chinese autocracy and continues to press ahead with its own version of liberal democracy, largely in search of an international democratic guarantee against the China threat. South Korea trades extensively with China but still develops a robust liberal democracy for pursuing its own political destiny. ASEAN's increasing impatience with a Chinese-backed authoritarian military government in Myanmar signals an increasing realisation by most Southeast Asian states that economic modernisation will inevitably lead to political liberalisation in their own societies. China's own political liberalisation is glacial but still evident. Only when the Chinese Communist Party acknowledges that such liberalisation must ultimately and inevitably change how politics works inside China, however, will prospects for a multilateral security community in the Asia-Pacific become something more than a pipe dream.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Asia-Pacific security community-building is possible, but only if at least two conditions – liberal democratic norms shared by regional states and the expansion of democratic community leadership throughout the region – are met. This does not suggest that the shared perception of a common threat among democracies matters little, but this perception alone would only allow regional states to function as Hobbesian military alliances. This chapter further challenges the thesis asserting that security community-building does not necessarily require liberal democratic values and a core liberal state to provide leadership. The Asia-Pacific experience shows that neither common nor compatible values provide powerful binding glue if they are illiberal or autocratic

and that liberal values alone remain insufficient for pluralistic security community-building and maintenance.

Material factors alone do not automatically prevent states from pursuing the task of security community-building and maintenance. Ideational factors that underpin liberal democracies are more likely to encourage such a process. In the Asia-Pacific, the US–Japan alliance validates this axiom by functioning as a bilateral security community and by evolving into a more regionally based element for shaping the security politics of other Asian states. Analogical evidence shows that non-democratic states are least likely to turn their short-term or temporary military alliances into security communities. Democratic and non-democratic states (that is, ASEAN) may also try to build a security community, but their ties are often constrained because their levels of mutual trust remain low. The recent violent crackdowns on protesters by the junta regime in Myanmar, for instance, led to a crisis in ASEAN, where at least some member states showed great displeasure with what happened under this military dictatorship. Overall, electorates and political elites in democratic states tend not to project norms of compromise and consensus to non-democratic states, especially on security matters.

Democratic community leadership also matters significantly. ASEAN will not become a genuine security community until all of its states are democratic and one of its member states becomes a powerful democratic state capable of leading the way. The argument that democratic leadership brings more harm than help is generally misleading. Washington's democratic leadership has acted mostly as a balancer and a guarantor on behalf of other regional democracies in ways that have been instrumental in preventing both democratic and non-democratic states hostile to each other from going to war. The US military presence in Northeast Asia has done much, for example, to prevent China from launching offensive attacks on Taiwan. The role of the United States as the still acknowledged leader among Asia-Pacific democracies must not be overlooked, either. The fact that territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan did not escalate into armed conflict may also be attributed to the United States being the common senior ally to its two Asian democratic allies that, nevertheless, view each other as long-standing rivals.

It has already been emphasised here that an eclectic approach to security community-building drawing upon insights from the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian theoretical perspectives constitutes 'democratic realist institutionalism'. The application of power politics between democracies as well as between democracies and other types of states will continue indefinitely, but democratic cultural norms tend to mitigate those dynamics most conducive to conflict or war. Within their

orbit, democracies may seek compromise to their differences in ways that reinforce the notion that war between them is unthinkable and maintain faith in the fairness of democratic processes as they are played out in each other's political systems. Asian democracies appear to have followed a similar trend: Japan and South Korea will hardly fight a war while both are confronted with a far more threatening and autocratic North Korean regime armed with weapons of mass destruction and requisite delivery systems. Nor are Australia and a burgeoning democratic Indonesia as likely to confront each other as to collaborate against forces of international terrorism that have increasingly threatened both of them.

Given this context, a tentative theoretical proposition formulared for further empirical testing is as follows: a security community is what democratic states and their community leaders – democratic states and their leaders alone – can make of it. If this proposition can be validated through examining empirical evidence, 'democratic' (rather than political) realist institutionalism as an eclectic theory of security community-building can be eventually operationalised and applied to reach greater understanding on such communities' formulation, maintenance and application. Of course there is a remote prospect that a security community will come into being but that its member states share no democratic norms notwithstanding the presence of a powerful democratic member in their midst. Or democratic states might share norms and have a powerful state in their midst, but still not realise a true security community. Neither outcome seems, as likely, however, as mutual democratic cultures and practices leading to greater trust and affinity and higher probabilities of a regional security community evolving as a result of such feelings. That scenario still seems the most visionary and promising model for Asia-Pacific states to pursue in their quest for more regional stability and for a greater standing within the international system at large.

9   Human security and global governance

Akiko Fukushima and William T. Tow

The growing prominence of the individual as a significant factor in international relations is a striking characteristic of contemporary world politics. Yet the role of the state remains critical to 'either reducing or exacerbating the underlying causes of threats to human security' (Lee 2004: 102). The extent to which 'traditional' state-centric, and 'non-traditional' people-oriented, approaches to security politics are being reconciled in the Asia-Pacific is an increasingly central component of that region's international relations.

Long-standing tendencies by elites within the region to favour the preservation of absolute national sovereignty over the well-being of the citizens who live within a state's boundaries and to prioritise the power of the state over human rights or 'good global governance' are softening in the aftermath of recent transnational security events such as the Asian financial crisis, the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak, bird flu epidemics and the Indian Ocean tsunami crisis. These events have threatened human safety and welfare across boundaries without regard to traditional security preoccupations by individual states. The importance of external military threats, structural changes that introduce new power balances, and competition over resources, ideology and faith remain critical to the 'regional-global security nexus'. However, they are increasingly subject to 'a mutually reinforcing dynamic between state, societal and individual security' (Hoadley 2006: 20; also see Michael and Marshall 2007: 10). If key regional and extra-regional powers fail to recognise this dynamic and manage its implications, the outlook for regional stability and prosperity will deteriorate substantially, and conflict will intensify at both the intra-state and inter-state levels.

This perspective constitutes our chapter's major argument. It will be developed in four sections. Recent trends in the Asia-Pacific that have most affected that region's states' and institutions' attitudes and policies towards human security will be assessed initially. Special emphasis will be assigned in a second section to Japan's experiences in this context, because that country has been a spearhead in developing and applying